The explosion of six bombs on February 16th in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in what may have been an attempt to assassinate the country's president Islam Karimov, killed at least 15 people and injured over 100. The attack, which targeted key government buildings, called the stability of this strategically located Central Asian nation into question.

Since Uzbekistan is a country where information is under very tight government control, the full truth about the February 16th events will most likely never be known. Rather than contributing credible information about the bombings and their aftermath, Uzbekistan's unfree media is busy circulating government propaganda. Given the absence of credible information, the Tashkent bombings remain the subject of rumors and speculation. A credible explanation for this mysterious attack has yet to be offered.

What is clear is that as in past instances of alleged anti-government activity (the murders of officials in Namangan province in 1996-97, the alleged terrorist training in Turkey of young Uzbeks by Erk party activists reported in 1994), the Uzbek government is using these bombings as an excuse to intensify its crackdown on religiously based and secular dissent. The response of the West, especially the United States, to this crackdown will have long term implications not just for human rights in Uzbekistan and Central Asia as a whole, but for the very stability that both Washington and Tashkent are striving to preserve.

Possible explanations for who is behind the bombings immediately focused on five major groups of suspects. Tajik forces angry over alleged Uzbek support for an uprising in northern Tajikistan last year, Russian retaliation for Uzbekistan's recent decision to pull out of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, and former high government officials fired during a recent anti-corruption campaign in Uzbekistan, which was probably the result of an intense power struggle within the country's ruling elite, were all singled out as possible responsible parties. In addition, some of President Karimov's open political opponents, such as leaders of the banned Birlik and Erk parties, alleged that he is behind the bombings in order to justify a crackdown on dissent. Finally, there is the Uzbek government's official explanation of the event-that Islamic militants, together with some opposition figures who until now were considered to have a secular and democratic orientation, were attempting to assassinate President Karimov, take over the government, and establish an Islamic state.

The official Uzbek government version leaves much to be desired. In the wake of the bombings, the Uzbek government has made sweeping allegations of an international terrorist conspiracy involving terrorist training of young Uzbeks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Chechnya. After initially blaming unnamed foreign countries for the bombings, the Uzbek government then accused numerous foreign terrorist organizations, operating without the knowledge of their respective governments. Most recently, in addition to the Uzbek government's chief suspect Tohir Yuldash, the head of an Uzbek paramilitary unit that participated in the Tajik civil war, President Karimov has accused the head of the banned Erk party, Muhammad Solih, of being behind the bombings.

There are disturbing indications that rather than trying to methodically investigate the identities of the real culprits, the Uzbek authorities are engaged in a panicked witch hunt, which has the added benefit of cracking down further on both religious and secular opponents. Indeed, within a few hours of the attack, President Karimov stated that Islamic extremists were responsible, without any clear evidence. Of course, some panic is understandable in the wake of shocking events like the Tashkent bombings. One has only to recall the initial accusations of Moslem terrorism in the immediate aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing to see how even a stable, democratic nation like the United States can succumb to irrational speculation in the face of terrorist attacks. The difference between the United States and Uzbekistan is not only that American law enforcement officials' higher level of professionalism and technical know-how led to the quick discovery that people other than Moslem extremists were to blame, but that because the United States is a country governed by rule of law, even if Moslem extremists had been behind the bombing, the American government would not have arrested hundreds of innocent people in a panicked attempt to find the culprits. The Uzbek government's history of engaging in widespread, arbitrary arrests in the wake of real or alleged attempts to destabilize the country, combined with the lack of rule of law in Uzbekistan, means that it is highly unlikely that the wide ranging crackdown that is currently taking place will eventually give way to a meticulous, professional and non-politically motivated investigation of the attack, and therefore, the true culprits behind the bombings may never be found.

In addition, few facts surrounding the bombing itself have been made public, and those that have are suspicious. The one bomb which was allegedly aimed at President Karimov exploded in an area protected by extremely tight security, the Cabinet of Ministers' building, located on Independence Square, during a meeting of the country's top leadership. It is hard to imagine that a car full of armed men and bombs could get anywhere near this building during such an important meeting, especially when the president was scheduled to appear. In addition, the car that carried the bomb, a GAZ-21, is a cheap and old model which dates from the 1960s, nothing like the sleek newer cars that are usually seen dropping off officials there. Nevertheless, the bombers reportedly managed to drive up to the building's front entrance, set the bomb, and move away just a few minutes before President Karimov was to arrive. The bombers were then able to somehow escape the scene of the crime and have still not been apprehended.

According to a statement made by Uzbek ambassador to the United States Sodyq Safaev on March 3rd, this took place because police and security guards were distracted by gunfire coming from a nearby government building. Because of this diversion, according to Ambassador, the bombers were able to break the police cordon, deliver and set the bomb, and escape. Why only one and not several security cordons protected President Karimov and the rest of the government's top leadership from such an attack remains unclear. Even if this explanation is taken at face value, it is hard to imagine how the bombers managed to escape amidst what must have been a large security detachment in a wide open, public space in broad daylight. The Uzbek government's version of the events are analogous to bombers driving a rusty old VW van up to the front entrance of the Capitol building during the President's annual State of the Union address, exploding a bomb, and then somehow escaping.

Of course, it is possible that the bombing and the bombers' escape happened due to extreme incompetence on the part of Uzbek security forces and police, who are more accustomed to arresting unarmed dissidents than matching wits with determined terrorists. Alternatively, high-ranking security officers at the scene could have allowed the bombers to bypass security as part of a plot to assassinate President Karimov on behalf of some of the numerous potential enemies mentioned above. In either case, there have been no reports of large scale firings or arrests of security officials which, in the face of such gross negligence or dangerous plotting, would logically follow the near elimination of the country's top leadership.

As for the alleged motive of the bombers, the official version that Islamic extremists together with some more secular dissidents were trying to kill President Karimov has not yet been adequately backed by facts. Despite government assertions to the contrary, there have never been any credible, proven reports of opposition activists committing politically motivated acts of violence in Uzbekistan. Even if such groups exist, the supposition that violent activists could organize and execute such a sophisticated operation, given the widespread network of spies and informers in the country, and the severe crackdown since the 1997 murders of police officials in Namangan province that has been waged by the Uzbek government, against any Islamic believer who is even remotely linked to opposition activities, strains the bounds of credibility. As far as the Tajik or Russian variant is concerned, no evidence has surfaced to prove either assertion, and it appears that, despite Uzbekistan's complicated relationship with both countries, the Uzbek government does not believe that either are responsible for the attack.

Given the dearth of reliable information and the weakness of the official Uzbek government explanation, the allegation made by some Uzbek opposition figures that Uzbek security agents set off the bombs themselves on the order of President Karimov in order to justify the current crackdown on dissent, although it sounds bizarre, cannot be dismissed outright.

At the same time, this theory is not sufficiently backed by evidence either. It is not clear how President Karimov would benefit by showing the weakness of his security agencies, which, after all, are the main pillars of his regime. Additionally, he most likely did not need such a serious terrorist attack to justify to the West his past and current crackdowns against his opponents. Although the harassment of independent Islamic and secular activists in Uzbekistan since 1992 has received some criticism from the international community, the West in general continues to support President Karimov, considering his government to be better than the perceived alternatives of chaos or an Islamic revolution in Uzbekistan.

If these bombings were staged, they were most likely intended to mobilize domestic support for the regime. Despite its relative political stability, for which President Karimov has received a lot of the credit, Uzbekistan faces a variety of daunting economic and social problems for which many Uzbeks hold the government responsible. The average salary (including that of doctors, schoolteachers and university professors) is about $20 per month, an amount sufficient to pay for little more than bread and tea, the traditional food of poor people in the country. Peasants on collective farms often do not receive their salaries for years. When average Uzbeks compare their wages with the extreme wealth of a small groups of "new Uzbeks", mainly high-rank officials and successful business people, who tend to be close relatives of people in the government, they naturally feel a lot of resentment. Given this explosive situation, perhaps the Uzbek government believes that, in order to justify its own legitimacy and ensure its hold on power, it needs new "enemies of the people", a new wave of repression against dissent, and a strengthening of its already huge security and police forces.

No matter who is behind the attack, there are many indications that the Uzbek government is using the bombings to justify a further escalation of its seven-year long crackdown on dissent in general and, especially since late 1997, independent Islam in particular. Since the government has succeeded in largely neutralizing the country's secular opposition, only Islamic believers who are not affiliated with the country's officially sanctioned, tightly controlled religious structures remain as potential centers of opposition. Hundreds have been arrested and scores imprisoned since the latest crackdown began, and in today's Uzbekistan, even wearing a beard, a sign of Islamic piety, or religious clothing, can lead to arrest, if the person is not a member of the official clergy. About one month before Tashkent bombings, the Union of Councils' Central Asian Human Rights Information Network (CAHRIN) project and Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU), published a list of 161 possible political prisoners in Uzbekistan, including five Islamic activists who have disappeared and five prisoners who have died in prison.¹

All of these 161 possible political prisoners were most likely jailed for their non-violent religious or political activities. Some of them might have committed minor violations of the law, but it is strongly believed that the severity of their sentences is disproportionate to the severity of their alleged crimes. There is no credible evidence that any of these prisoners have committed violent or serious crimes, despite government assertions to the contrary. The prosecution of many of these prisoners is clearly politically motivated, and in most cases is a result of the government's campaign against the independent Islamic movement. There are probably many political prisoners in Uzbekistan whose prosecution has not been reported. This list of 161 may therefore be the proverbial tip of the iceberg, especially since the wave of arrests following the Tashkent bombings.

The government of Uzbekistan has blamed Islamic extremists for several high profile murders of government officials in Namangan province in 1996-97 and for attempting to establish by force an Islamic state in the country. However, authorities have never presented any credible evidence to prove these charges. Instead, many human rights activists in Uzbekistan believe that the real murderers have not yet been found and instead, hundreds of innocent people have been jailed. ² Similarly, we will probably never know who organized the February 16th bombings in Tashkent, but if the arrests and trials which are currently taking place follow the pattern set by the trials of suspects in the Namangan murders, innocent political dissidents will probably be presented as terrorists and their Stalin era style confessions, obtained by torture and other illegal methods, will be characterized as proof of their guilt. In comparison to the post-Namangan crackdown, it is likely that the scale of repression that will follow this alleged attempt to assassinate President Karimov will be even larger.

Following past patterns, Uzbek authorities have broadened their list of suspects to include Muhammed Solih, chairman of the banned opposition party Erk. Mr. Solih, who was allowed to run (unsuccessfully) against President Karimov in the 1991 presidential elections , is now one of the chief suspects in the bombing investigation. The unproven, 1994-95 charge that Mr. Solih and a few of his supporters recruited twenty young men from the Qashqadaryo (Kashkadaryo) region of Uzbekistan to come to Chechnya and Turkey for terrorist training has been brought up again.³

Mr. Solih and some of his followers are now accused of carrying out "terrorist training" once again in Turkey in 1997-98. While it appears likely that Mr. Solih did recruit young Uzbeks for some sort of training in 1994, no training of any kind in Turkey was reported since then. In the light of Uzbek government's practice of bringing unproven charges against dissidents, and since this latest training was only "discovered" in the weeks since the Tashkent bombings, the current accusations against Mr. Solih look doubtful.

The Uzbek media have mounted a campaign to demonize Mr. Solih since the latest accusations surfaced. Uzbek Television ran a story on March 1st that called Mr. Solih a "traitor to his motherland" and the Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka ran a story that linked him to Tohir Yuldash, the leader of an Uzbek paramilitary organization mentioned above, whom the newspaper characterized as a "Wahhabi" with terrorist links in Pakistan, Turkey, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. In the past, there have been reports of Uzbek units composed of hundreds of fighters within the United (Islamic) Tajik Opposition, which until recently was based in Afghanistan. Tohir Yuldash, originally from Namangan, is the best known leader of these fighters. However, no evidence had been yet presented to prove the alleged terrorist connection between him and Mr. Solih.

In addition, one of Mr. Solih's brothers, Rashid Begjon, has been held incommunicado since his arrest on February 23rd.⁴ Between 1994-96, Mr. Begjon was in prison for one and half years reportedly for disseminating calls to hold democratic elections. Muhammad Begjon, another brother of Solih, was reported arrested in Kiev, Ukraine along with three other Uzbek citizens, members of Birlik and Erk, at the request of Uzbek authorities. On March 18th they were extradited to Uzbekistan. While Mr. Solih lives in relative safety outside of Uzbekistan, if past practice is any indication, it is likely that many of his associates are among those who have been arrested since the bombings. On March 16th, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that President Karimov had requested Interpol to arrest Solih and extradite him to Uzbekistan. ⁵

The criminal justice system in Uzbekistan is so corrupt, subservient to government control, and essentially lawless that few arrests or convictions, even in common criminal cases, can be characterized as having been carried out "by the book". There have been numerous reports that police routinely plant narcotics and weapons in the pockets, cars or homes of suspects. In Uzbekistan, such illegal activity by the police is common practice in the general fight against crime. Frequently, concrete evidence of a defendant's guilt is not necessary to find him guilty, especially in political cases. Often, a credible connection between the crime and the defendant does not exist at all. Defendants, especially in cases where there is no evidence to support the charges against them, are often tortured and subjected to psychological degradation and intimidation in order to obtain confessions. As in many other ex-Soviet states, conditions in jails and forced labor camps are overcrowded and extremely inhumane.

Given these widespread systemic problems, the recent promise by President Karimov that the bombers will be given a fair trial in line with the letter and spirit of the law seems unlikely to be fulfilled. When these public practices are put into action against real or perceived opposition figures, the results are often massive illegalities and human rights violations. Many of those who have been imprisoned over the past years on charges of narcotics possession are Islamic clergy. Out of the 161 possible political prisoners that CAHRIN and HRSU has been able to identify, at least 20 are Islamic clergy, in many cases nationally or locally known religious leaders. This casts further doubt on the credibility of the Uzbek government's charges against the so-called "Wahhabis" because it is hard to imagine such a large number of spiritual leaders of whatever faith using or selling narcotics, especially if they truly are members of the ultra-orthodox, puritan Wahabbi sect, as the Uzbek government alleges.

Uzbek authorities have admitted to arresting 30 people in the wake of the bombings but since February 24th, there have been no official reports of new arrests within the country. However, unofficial sources report hundreds of arrests in Uzbekistan and between 25-30 arrests outside the country. Some of those arrested abroad have been extradited to Uzbekistan. Vitaly Ponomarev, the director of the CAHRIN's Moscow office, stated at a press conference on March 1st that at least 200 people have been arrested so far in Tashkent alone. Human rights monitors report that the arrests usually happen at night and that police often wear masks. Monitors also report that most relatives of those who have been arrested are afraid to talk about the arrests because they were threatened that they would be jailed if they did so. Given the unreliability of Uzbek government sources of information and the scarcity of independent information, it is unclear how large the latest crackdown's scale is. To date, no terrorist ringleaders have been caught. Instead, the Uzbek security forces seem to be concentrating on anybody who has perceived links to opposition activists.

For example, on February 25th, RFE/RL and Amnesty International reported on the arrests of Mamadali Makhmudov, a writer and former political prisoner, and Munira Nasriddinova, wife of the independent Islamic leader Obidkhon Nazarov, who either disappeared, or according to some reports, was forced to leave Uzbekistan in March 1998. Mr. Makhmudov is reportedly being held incommunicado. Ms. Nasriddinova was reportedly beaten during her arrest and was held incommunicado for 10 days on charges of "hooliganism."⁸ Amnesty International reported on March 9, 1999 that Ms. Nasiddinova was only released after she signed a statement saying that she had no grounds for complaint about her detention. There were additional reports that several other relatives of Obidhon Nazarov and Muhtabar Ahmedova , a former political prisoner in 1994 who defended persecuted Islamic activists, were also arrested.

In addition, trials stemming from the wave of arrests of independent Islamic activists since December 1997 are continuing. The Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, RFE/RL and Amnesty International reported on March 8, 1999 that Akhmadkhon Turakhanov, a 59 year old member of Birlik and the Independent Human Rights Organization, collapsed in court towards the end of his trial on March 5, 1999. Despite the fact that he suffers from diabetes, he has reportedly not received proper medical care since his detention in December 1998 on charges that he had called for the "overthrow of the constitutional order of Uzbekistan". Reportedly, the charge stems from his open criticism of the local government. After a trial during which reportedly he was not allowed to have any contact with his lawyer, Mr. Turakhanov was sentenced to five and half years in prison and lost conscious when judge was announcing his sentence term. Reportedly, his real "offense" was that he helped people write complaints against local officials.

As a Moslem believer and a chairman of the Namangan city branch of the banned opposition Birlik movement, Mr. Turakhanov is a typical example of a "usual suspect," to be rounded up on a regular basis whenever it suits the Uzbek government's needs. In fact, Mr. Turakhanov was previously imprisoned in 1994 for one and a half years after a shotgun was allegedly found in his car.

President Karimov has been careful to distinguish between "good" Moslems, meaning those who adhere to the officially approved and government controlled religious structures and are otherwise loyal to the government, and "bad" Moslems, who wish remain independent of officials religious structures and allegedly plot the overthrow of Uzbekistan's "secular and democratic system" to be replaced by an Islamic state. President Karimov has also stated that the ideology of Moslem extremism must be combated with ideas. While this may sound like President Karimov is advocating an open dialogue on the future of Uzbekistan's political system, what this statement really indicates is Karimov's current view of independent religion as an ideological enemy to be struggled against using state-controlled ideology. This in effect means the intensification of a massive propaganda offensive in the Uzbek media against independent Islam and even secular dissent, the representatives of which will play the role of the new, post-Soviet "enemies of the people." President Karimov's personal attitude towards independent Islamic believers was aptly demonstrated by his statement to the Uzbek parliament on April 30, 1998 that if they did nothing against Islamic fanatics, he would shoot them in the head himself. The Uzbek government's call for ideological struggle against independent Islam has had some immediate effects. Reportedly, in an alarming throwback to Stalin era practices, some human rights activists have recently been subjected to long and humiliating public criticism sessions, organized by local officials.

Another sample of a "good" statement made by President Karimov are his words during a television interview immediately after the bombings. At this press conference, President Karimov said that "his staff and prosecutor's office were preparing a list of those jailed for involvement in events in the Ferghana Valley." President Karimov declared: "Tell me who among them are true criminals" dividing those imprisoned into two groups-- "people who organized this and people who lack awareness, who were led astray." "I am ready to amnesty" the latter group, Karimov stated, "but not because we are afraid. I am ready to pardon them and have given instructions." He gave no specific details of who would be amnestied, and his promise has not yet resulted in anybody getting out of jail. Although President Karimov's good will has so far been expressed only in words, it may provide some opportunities for dialogue with his government regarding possible political prisoners in the country. On the other hand, he has never repeated this statement, in contrast to his accusations against Islamic extremists and Mr. Solih, which have been repeated by him and his aides numerous times.

On March 3, 1999, the Uzbek ambassador to the United States Sodyq Safaev explicitly linked the bombing to Osama bin Laden's terrorist network during a presentation at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. These allegations are a blatant appeal for US assistance against common enemies. Whether or not the bombings are a result of an international terrorist conspiracy, Tashkent seems to be betting on the US turning a blind eye to human rights abuses committed in the name of punishing Islamic terrorists and stemming the growth of fundamentalism in the region. Reportedly, German and American experts are assisting Uzbek investigators in the investigation of the bombings. Certainly, this is a positive step. However, Western participation in the investigation will most likely be limited to forensic tests and advice on how to best catch the culprits and will not be expanded to monitoring of police practices, human rights abuses or if the Uzbek authorities present adequate evidence to prove charges of terrorism.

A March 5th New York Times editorial entitled "Unstable Autocracies in Central Asia" stated that the US policy of supporting dictatorships in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the name of stability is shortsighted because as shown by the Tashkent bombings, harsh dictatorships in this region tend to be inherently unstable.¹⁰ While short term stability can create a friendly business climate for American firms, the corruption, lack of rule of law, and widespread governmental interference in the economy that are characteristic of Central Asian dictatorships does a lot to actually drive away long term investment. This is an especially important consideration given the importance of long term stability to the oil, gas and mineral sectors, the principal potential source of wealth in the region and the main reason for Central Asia's strategic importance. If present trends continue, there is the truly frightening possibility that Uzbekistan will dissolve into chaos, dragging the rest of the region down with it. In other words, continued economic decline, accompanied by overpopulation, a dangerously high rate unemployment, growing wealth inequality and further repression of non-violent dissent may well lead to further radicalization of the opposition. The greatest fear of both the Uzbek governing elite and its Western backers may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Supporting stability and a secular regime in Uzbekistan, which is a key country in an important region on the crossroads of interests of many great and local powers, is clearly in the US interest. But the current artificial and likely temporary stability, based on oppression, is most likely unsustainable. The best way to guarantee stability is not increased repression but rather a gradual, step by step set of political and economic reforms, and dialogue with the moderate opposition, both Islamic and democratic, which has, as of yet, not yet been destroyed. These steps will create opportunities for a non-violent transition to a more open society.

ENDNOTES

1 "List of Possible Political Prisoners," http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/021199uzbpris2.shtm, January 21, 1999.
2 See Abdumannob Polat's report "Does Islamic Fanaticism Threaten Stability?" at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/120998uzbek.shtml and in Turkistan E-Newsletter, http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/turkistan.htm ; see also Human Rights Watch Report "Crackdown In The Farghona Valley: Arbitrary Arrests And Religious Discrimination", May 1998, at www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/uzbekistan.
3 The elections were considered by most observers to be neither free nor fair.
4 See Abdumannob Polat's article in Central Asia Monitor, No. 2, 1995, pp. 33. Shortly thereafter, dozens of Erk party members were arrested and several were imprisoned.
5 RFE/RL Newsline, March 5, 1999 and Jamestown Monitor, March 5, 1999.
6 Reported by RFE/RL Newsline and Amnesty International March 9, 1999.
7 "…While Uzbek President Confirms Arrests," RFE/RL Newsline, March 16, 1999.
8 Amnesty International February 25, 1999; March 9, 1999.
9 "President Vows to 'Cut off Hands' of Tashkent Bombers," BBC Monitoring-- CAU Uzbek Weekly, available at (www.soros.org.uzbekistan.omri/0131.html).
10 "Unstable Autocracies in Central Asia," The New York Times, March 5, 1999.

Abdumannob Polat is Director of the Union of Councils' (UCSJ) Central Asian Human Rights Information Network and Chairman of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan. Nickolai Butkevich is UCSJ's Research and Advocacy Coordinator. UCSJ is a grassroots human rights organization with nearly thirty years of experience working in the FSU.

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